

February 21, 1990

E6B

TWO PLUS FOUR:
ADVANTAGES, POSSIBLE CONCERNS AND REBUTTAL POINTS

RELEASED IN FULL

ADVANTAGES

A month ago, German unification threatened to spin out of control and damage important American interests. Two Plus Four grew out of our need to create an orderly "process" that would maintain American involvement in (and even some control over) the unification debate.

Two Plus Four has improved our position in the following ways:

- 1) By asserting American leadership in getting the six to agree on Two Plus Four, we have, both publicly and privately, reinforced your point that America is and will remain a European power.
- 2) In working first with the Germans, then with the British and the French, and finally with the Soviets, we have created a model for continued consultations on the issue.
 - The Germans have made this point explicitly with us.
- 3) Through our brokering, we have gotten the Soviets, the GDR, the British, and the French to join with us and the FRG in explicitly agreeing to "unity as the goal."
- 4) We also have the Four Powers (and the GDR) agreeing with us and the FRG that internal aspects are to be solved by the Germans alone.
 - These are notable achievements. (Both Kohl and Genscher appreciate your help in bringing about an agreement that publicly locks-in the Soviets, the French, and the British on these two critical points.)
- 5) We've deflected calls for Four Power talks or a 35-Nation CSCE Summit on German unification.
 - Four Power talks would have created exactly what everyone wanted to avoid: a rising tide of German nationalism in response to others trying to determine Germany's fate.
 - A 35-Nation CSCE Summit would be too unwieldy and slow to deal with this fast-moving situation. It would also give the Soviets a veto over the process.

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- 6) In Two Plus Four, we've created a process everyone can live with but no one can overly manipulate.
 - By putting the Two before the Four, we solved the Germans' dilemma of wanting to unify without undue interference from the outside.
 - By adding the Four to the Two, we have Thatcher, Mitterrand, and Gorbachev all on board and involve the Four Powers only where they rightly belong: on questions involving the external implications of unification. Meanwhile, each can use the Two Plus Four process for his or her own internal needs:
 - * Gorbachev to explain why unification is okay, Thatcher and Mitterrand to show that they're involved in the game. (Indeed, all of them, including Gorbachev in his Pravda interview, appear to be taking credit for the Two Plus Four idea.)
 - The Two Plus Four mechanism does not create a veto. The unification process will in any case go forward. The Two Plus Four mechanism does provide an orderly means to devolve remaining Four Power rights on a unified Germany, a step which will under any circumstance require Soviet acquiescence.
 - Two Plus Four is not an event or a formal negotiation. Nor is it a replacement for a final German settlement. It is simply "a process of incremental consultations."
 - * The process does give us additional support (the UK and France) on keeping a united Germany in NATO.

2+4 is
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* *

POSSIBLE CONCERNS AND REBUTTAL POINTS

- 1) Doesn't Two Plus Four unnecessarily cut the Soviets in?
 - They're already in -- with troops in the GDR and Four Power obligations. And they're likely to try and move further in by playing on the fears the Poles have of a united Germany.
 - The Germans clearly recognize the Soviet role. Kohl cleared his 10 points with (them) not us, and we found out about his visit to Moscow from the Soviets, not the Germans. There is simply no way to cut the Soviets out; they'll always have the bilateral card to play.
 - The Soviets will continue to present their needs to the Germans -- who will be under pressure to respond, especially with national elections on the horizon.

- With Two Plus Four, the Soviets can't stop the internal process; the Germans will call the shots. And on the external, they're tied into a process that includes Germany -- unlike the strict Four Power talks the Soviets wanted just weeks ago.
- The bottom line: They're already in. But we want them in our tent, not in one of their own working with the Germans.

2) Doesn't Gorbachev need an "explanation" for domestic reasons?

- Unification is an emotional issue for the Soviets domestically. It's highly charged politically, and Gorbachev needs to take certain public postures to deal with that.

★ ★ ★ What he needs more than anything is a process or mechanism that shows he's managing the issue in a way that handles Soviet concerns and needs. (By last December, he had already tried both Four Power talks and a 35-Nation Summit.) If a mechanism doesn't exist, he'll create one with the Germans.

- Two Plus Four gives him the explanation he needs domestically.

WHAT USSR WANTS:

(7) In the end, he'll need a package to show what he got in part for compensation for the idea of Germany in NATO and in part to meet Soviet security needs. While this can't be determined now, it might include: 1) No NATO forces in the GDR; 2) Delayed Soviet troop withdrawals from the GDR; 3) Special provisions for German troops in the GDR; 4) No German possession or production of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; 5) Legally-binding commitments on borders; and 6) Bundeswehr reductions, probably in CFE II. We expect such a package would include an implicit, if not explicit, economic component of German economic benefits for the Soviets.

- The bottom line: Right now, Gorbachev needs to show he has some control over the process. Two Plus Four gives him that cover with little real control. Later, he'll need a defensible package to sell to his domestic audience.

3) Will Two Plus Four force the Soviets to lock-in a NO NATO stance they won't be able to yield on?

- So far, they've avoided taking such a position even though they have had ample opportunity. Moreover, they've been able to shift other positions (e.g., no unification) without taking undue heat.

You haven't seen a leveraged buy-out until you see this one! (Not just the economic buy-out of GDR - but of USSR as well.)

- Events and internal unity will force the issue, not a process like Two Plus Four. The March 18 election will crystallize the issue for Gorbachev domestically, and he will have to show quickly that he's working on it.
- Two Plus Four provides that necessary safety valve for him. He can always say he's working on the issue in the Two Plus Four framework.
- If he really decides to say no to NATO, he'll do so with the Germans by probably focusing on specific criteria (e.g., troop limits, no US nuclear capability, etc.), not the generic case of NATO membership. Indeed, the Soviets will have more leverage to make this case bilaterally, not in Two Plus Four.
- In any case, we'll be able to probe Soviet thinking in the April Ministerial; we can and should put off any Ministerial Two Plus Four discussions until after that meeting.
- The Bottom Line: Events, not Two Plus Four, may force the Soviets to determine a position on NATO membership. Two Plus Four gives us and them a process to at least manage some events so we don't unnecessarily force the Soviets' hand.

4) Won't Two Plus Four lead to discussions on security issues we don't want to discuss now?

- Because Two Plus Four is a discussion, not a negotiation, the others can raise what they want to raise. We are not committed to responding at all if we don't want to.
- And if we do want to discuss such issues, it's better we have the Germans wrapped in the cocoon of Two Plus Four -- preceded by One Plus Three -- when such issues are raised. That'll force them to be more up front with us.
- Moreover, it's best to backstop the Germans with the British, the French, and us. We're all agreed on the key issue: Germany in NATO.
- The Bottom Line: Two Plus Four only commits us to those things we want to talk about.



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